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I. INTRODUCTION

When the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (Panel) transfers
class action cases to a transferee court for pretrial purposes, a fundamental and potentially case-dispositive question arises: Which circuit’s law
will the transferee court apply to the class certification determination?
As described below, district courts are divided into two camps on this
issue. One camp, following the principle of comity, applies the transferor courts’ law. The other camp, following the principle of unitary law,
applies its own circuit’s law. This Article describes the clash of principles underlying these two approaches, explains why neither approach
produces satisfactory results under the current multidistrict litigation system, and presents a solution to end the division on this important choiceof-law issue.
Under the multidistrict litigation (MDL) procedure, the Panel assigns multiple federal lawsuits to a single district court (transferee court)
for pretrial proceedings.1 The MDL assignment is technically for pretrial
proceedings only, and unless the transferred cases are resolved during
pretrial proceedings, the Panel must remand the cases back to the courts
from which they were transferred (transferor courts) for trial.2 The
choice-of-law issue for class certification is of paramount importance
because there are several significant conflicts between the circuits’ case
law. Examples include critical issues such as the rigor with which courts
†
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1. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1976).
2. See id.; see also infra Part II.B.
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examine experts’ opinions in connection with class certification,3 the
availability of pursuing monetary relief under a Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23(b)(2) injunctive relief class,4 the possibility of using fluid
recovery,5 and other issues that can make or break class certification.
Thus, on a practical level, the law that applies to the class certification
decision is a pivotal issue that can mean the difference between a multimillion-dollar class action and an insignificant individual lawsuit worth
as little as a few dollars.
In the last few years, the transferee courts that have grappled with
the choice-of-law question for class certification have resolved the issue
differently; some courts applied the law of the transferor courts and some
applied their own circuit’s law. On a philosophical level, this divide
represents a clash of fundamental legal principles: comity versus unitary
law. The principle of comity is the belief that courts should, under the
proper circumstances, voluntarily defer to another jurisdiction’s laws.6
The principle of unitary law is the belief that courts should adhere to a
single, uniform law to foster consistency and efficiency.7 In the MDL
class certification context, the principle of comity suggests that the transferee court should apply the law of the transferor courts because the
transferee court is merely handling the cases during the pretrial phase of
the litigation and the cases must be remanded to the transferor courts for
trial. In contrast, the principle of unitary law suggests that the transferee
court should apply its own law because there can be only one proper interpretation of federal law and the transferee court is bound to follow its
own circuit’s precedent.
Under the current MDL procedure, which requires cases to be remanded for trial, both the comity approach and the unitary law approach
have major intractable flaws. As described below, strict adherence to the
3. Compare In re Monosodium Glutamate Antitrust Litig., No. Civ. 00-MDL-1328 (PAM),
2003 WL 244729, at *1 (D. Minn. Jan. 29, 2003), and In re Pressure Sensitive Labelstock Antitrust
Litig., No. 3:03-MDL-1556, 2007 WL 4150666, at *6 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 19, 2007) (“[Rule 23] does
not require—or authorize—the Court to credit Plaintiffs’ evidence over Defendants’ or vice versa.”),
with In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 323 (3d Cir. 2008) (holding that weighing conflicting expert opinion evidence and examining the persuasive value of such evidence is
central to the class certification analysis under Rule 23).
4. See In re Wal-Mart Wage & Hour Employment Practices Litig., No. 2:06-CV-00225-PMPPAL, 2008 WL 3179315, at *5, *16 (D. Nev. June 20, 2008) (describing circuit split on this issue).
5. Compare McLaughlin v. American Tobacco Co., 522 F.3d 215, 231–32 (2d Cir. 2008)
(holding fluid recovery is unconstitutional in the class action context), with Simer v. Rios, 661 F.2d
655, 676 (7th Cir. 1981) (holding fluid recovery is appropriate under some circumstances).
6. See infra Part IV.A.
7. See infra Part IV.B.
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comity approach is inefficient, can produce inconsistent results, and can
require a district court to ignore its own circuit’s controlling precedent,
even to the point of violating the Constitution of the United States. Strict
adherence to the unitary law approach, on the other hand, can significantly impact the parties’ rights and, under certain circumstances, lead to inefficiency.
This Article explores the choice-of-law quandary and its important
role in MDL class action litigation, explains why the current approaches
to the choice-of-law issue are ineffective, and offers a possible legislative
solution. Specifically, Part II describes the MDL process generally to
provide a basis for discussion. Part III describes the general choice-oflaw rules in MDL proceedings. Part IV describes the case law addressing choice-of-law issues in MDL class certification proceedings. Part V
describes the major flaws that exist when applying the comity approach
or the unitary law approach to the class certification decision. Part VI
offers a solution: Congress should change the MDL rules to eliminate the
requirement of remand to the transferor courts, which will further consistency in class action MDL cases, increase judicial efficiency, and eliminate most of the problems district courts currently face in examining
choice-of-law issues in MDL class action cases. Part VII provides concluding remarks.
II. THE MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION PROCESS GENERALLY
When civil actions involving one or more common questions of fact
are pending in different districts, the Panel may transfer those actions to
a single district for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings under the MDL process.8 This Part describes the circumstances under
which the Panel will transfer cases filed in multiple districts to one district for pretrial proceedings and explains the remand requirement for
trial.
8. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (1976) provides:
When civil actions involving one or more common questions of fact are pending in different districts, such actions may be transferred to any district for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings. Such transfers shall be made by the judicial panel on multidistrict litigation authorized by this section upon its determination that transfers for such
proceedings will be for the convenience of parties and witnesses and will promote the just
and efficient conduct of such actions. Each action so transferred shall be remanded by
the panel at or before the conclusion of such pretrial proceedings to the district from
which it was transferred unless it shall have been previously terminated: Provided, however, [t]hat the panel may separate any claim, cross-claim, counter-claim, or third-party
claim and remand any of such claims before the remainder of the action is remanded.
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A. The MDL Transfer
The district court to which the Panel transfers the actions is typically called the “transferee court,” and the district courts from which the
cases are transferred are typically called the “transferor courts.” The
Panel will transfer the cases when it will serve the “convenience of parties and witnesses and will promote the just and efficient conduct of such
actions.”9 The MDL procedure aims to eliminate duplicative discovery,
avoid conflicting rulings and schedules, reduce litigation costs, and conserve the time and effort of the parties, attorneys, witnesses, and courts.10
The Panel determines where to transfer the actions. Unrestricted by
venue considerations, the Panel may transfer the actions to any federal
district court.11 The Panel may consider a number of factors when determining the transferee court, including whether (1) the parties prefer a
particular district;12 (2) a particular district is geographically convenient
and accessible to the litigants;13 (3) cases are already pending in a particular district;14 (4) a particular district court judge has already invested
significant time in developing familiarity with the issues likely to arise in
the actions;15 (5) a particular action was filed early or has advanced procedurally;16 (6) the evidence, parties, and witnesses are located in a particular district;17 (7) a potential transferee court has room on its docket;18
9. Id.
10. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 20.131 (2004).
11. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a); In re New York City Mun. Sec. Litig., 572 F.2d 49, 51 (2d Cir. 1978).
12. See, e.g., In re Rivastigamine Patent Litig., 360 F. Supp. 2d 1361, 1362 (J.P.M.L. 2005)
(choosing transferee district based on the agreement of the parties).
13. See, e.g., In re Intel Corp. Microprocessor Antitrust Litig., 403 F. Supp. 2d 1356, 1357
(J.P.M.L. 2005) (consolidating ten California actions and four Delaware actions in the District of
Delaware because, among other reasons, Delaware was a geographically convenient location for the
litigants).
14. See, e.g., In re Teflon Prods. Liab. Litig., 416 F. Supp. 2d 1364, 1365 (J.P.M.L. 2006)
(transferring cases to district court because, among other reasons, one of fourteen cases to be consolidated was already pending there).
15. See, e.g., In re American Invs. Life Ins. Co. Annuity Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 398 F.
Supp. 2d 1361, 1362 (J.P.M.L. 2005) (transferring cases to judge who had “already developed familiarity with the issues present in this docket as a result of presiding over motion practice and other
pretrial proceedings in the actions pending before her for the past year”).
16. See, e.g., In re JP Morgan Chase & Co. Sec. Litig., 452 F. Supp. 2d 1350, 1351 (J.P.M.L.
2006) (transferring to district where earlier filed and most procedurally advanced action was pending).
17. See, e.g., In re Long-Distance Tel. Serv. Fed. Excise Tax Refund Litig., MDL-1798, 2006
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94117, at *4 (J.P.M.L. Dec. 28, 2006) (transferring to District of Columbia where
witnesses and documents were likely to be in or near the district).
18. See, e.g., In re Educ. Testing Serv. PLT 7-12 Test Scoring Litig., 350 F. Supp. 2d 1363,
1365 (J.P.M.L. 2004) (transferring to district with “favorable caseload conditions”).
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and (8) a district has a judge experienced in handling multidistrict litigation.19 As described below, however, this transfer is for pretrial purposes
only.
B. The MDL Remand Requirement
Transferee courts make only pretrial decisions; the Panel must remand the cases back to the transferor courts for trial. The controlling
authority on this issue is Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes &
Lerach.20 In that case, the Supreme Court held that a district court conducting “pretrial proceedings” could not invoke the venue transfer statute21 to assign a case to itself for trial.22 The Court interpreted 28 U.S.C.
§ 1407’s use of the words “shall be remanded by the panel”23 as mandating the remand of the transferred cases back to the transferor courts for
trial.24 Lexecon made clear that the Panel was obligated to remand any
transferred case to its originating court when pretrial proceedings had
concluded.25
Lexecon is highly significant because it changed the landscape of
MDL proceedings. Prior to Lexecon, the vast majority of cases that entered into the MDL process were transferred to the transferee court for all
purposes, including trial.26 Transferee courts frequently transferred the
cases to themselves under the Rules of Procedure set forth by the Panel.27
That practice ground to a halt when the Supreme Court prohibited selftransfer in Lexecon.28
19. See, e.g., In re Human Tissue Prods. Liab. Litig., 435 F. Supp. 2d 1352, 1354 (J.P.M.L.
2006) (transferring cases to “a jurist who has the experience necessary to steer this litigation on a
prudent course”).
20. Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26 (1998).
21. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1996) (The venue transfer statute, provides: “For the convenience of
parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any
other district or division where it might have been brought.”).
22. Lexecon, 523 U.S. at 40–41.
23. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (1976). See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
24. Lexecon, 523 U.S. at 35 (citing Anderson v. Yungkau, 329 U.S. 482, 485 (1947)).
25. Id.
26. In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of Sept. 1, 1983, 829 F.2d 1171, 1176 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(noting that prior to Lexecon, over two-thirds of the actions transferred pursuant to the MDL procedure were not remanded to the transferor courts).
27. At the time of Lexecon, J.P.M.L. Rule of Procedure 14(b) provided: “Each transferred
action that has not been terminated in the transferee court shall be remanded by the Panel to the
transferor district for trial, unless ordered transferred by the transferee judge to the transferee or
other district under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) or 28 U.S.C. § 1406.” J.P.M.L. R. of Proc. 14(b) (1998).
28. See In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether Prods. Liab. Litig., 241 F.R.D. 185, 191 (S.D.N.Y.
2007) (citing In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1:00-1898, MDL 1358
(SAS), M21-88, 2005 WL 106936, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 18, 2005)) (noting that Lexecon has in-
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Interestingly, the Court did not pass judgment on the wisdom of
§ 1407’s remand requirement.29 Indeed, the Court noted that it “may or
may not be correct that permitting transferee courts to make selfassignments would be more desirable than preserving a plaintiff’s choice
of venue,” but found that a strict reading of § 1407 required the Panel to
remand transferred actions back to the transferor courts for trial.30 Ultimately, the Court concluded, if § 1407’s remand requirement was to be
eliminated, “the proper venue for resolving that issue remains the floor of
Congress.”31
Notwithstanding Lexecon, most cases do not go to trial, and therefore the practical impact of MDL consolidation is that the transferee
court usually decides the fate of the cases.32 For example, the transferee
court may decide whether to strike a fatal blow to the cases through a
motion to dismiss, summary judgment, or class certification determination. Alternatively, the transferee court may allow the cases to survive
pretrial proceedings. Given the magnitude of most cases consolidated
under the MDL procedure, a transferee court’s decision on class certification can mean the difference between a certified class action with potentially millions, if not billions, of dollars at issue and an individual
lawsuit worth an insignificant amount.33
III. CHOICE-OF-LAW RULES IN MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION
PROCEEDINGS GENERALLY
This Part examines the general choice-of-law issues in MDL proceedings. Generally speaking, the choice-of-law case law breaks up
nicely between state substantive law on the one hand and federal substantive and procedural law on the other. As described below, this division reflects a balance between respect for state law pluralism, in which
our legal system embraces differences, and a desire for a unitary federal
creased the number of remanded actions each year from several hundred to several thousand) [hereinafter MTBE II].
29. Id. at 40.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. James C. Duff, 2008 Annual Report of the Director, Judicial Business of the United States
Courts, Table S-20, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbususc/judbus.html. As of September
30, 2008, out of the 301,255 total actions subjected to the MDL procedure, only 11,665 actions were
remanded by the Panel. Id.
33. See, e.g., In re AOL Time Warner, Inc. Sec. and ERISA Litig., 381 F. Supp. 2d 192, 220
(S.D.N.Y. 2004); In re Silicone Breast Implant Prods. Liab. Litig. (MDL No. 926); and In re Vioxx
Prods. Liab. Litig., 501 F. Supp. 2d 789 (E.D. La. 2007). All three of these cases were class actions
that settled for more than a billion dollars.
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law, in which our legal system rejects inconsistencies and loss of efficiency.
A. Choice-of-Law for State Law Claims
A district court examining state law issues must use the choice-oflaw rules of the state in which the district court sits.34 In Van Dusen v.
Barrack and Ferens v. John Deere Co., the United States Supreme Court
held that when a case involving state law claims transfers from one district court to another pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404,35 the transferee court
must still follow the choice-of-law rules of the state in which the transferor court sits.36 In other words, the transfer does not alter the choice-oflaw analysis. In Van Dusen, the Court explained that “[a]lthough as a
matter of federal policy a case may be transferred to a more convenient
part of the system . . . [t]he case should remain as it was in all respects
but location.”37 A “change of venue . . . generally should be, with respect to state law, but a change of courtrooms.”38
Courts have consistently applied this holding to transfers taking
place under the MDL procedure.39 Thus, when analyzing issues of state
law in MDL proceedings, the transferee court must apply the choice-oflaw rules of the state or states in which the transferor courts sit (for example, the District of Kansas would apply California choice-of-law rules
in analyzing a negligence claim for a case transferred from the Northern
District of California). The result of this rule can be a complicated examination of multiple states’ choice-of-law rules, because each action
that originated in a different state will require a unique choice-of-law
analysis. In one MDL action, for example, a transferee court applied the
choice-of-law rules of the District of Columbia, Georgia, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Virginia.40

34. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496–97 (1941).
35. See supra note 21, and text accompanying the footnote.
36. Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 639 (1964); see also Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494
U.S. 516, 531 (1990).
37. Van Dusen, 376 U.S. at 633.
38. Id. at 639.
39. See, e.g., In re United States Office Prods. Co. Sec. Litig., 251 F. Supp. 2d 58, 68 (D.D.C.
2003); In re Ski Train Fire in Kaprun, Austria, 257 F. Supp. 2d 717, 723 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); In re
ConAgra Peanut Butter Prods. Liab. Litig., 251 F.R.D. 689, 693 (N.D. Ga. 2003); McCord v. Minn.
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 138 F. Supp. 2d 1180, 1186–87 (D. Minn. 2001).
40. In re Air Crash Disaster at Washington, 559 F. Supp. 333, 340–41 (D.D.C. 1983).
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B. Choice-of-Law for Federal Legal Issues
The choice-of-law analysis is different for federal legal issues in
cases that are transferred from one district court to another. Generally,
the circuit courts have held that the law of the transferee court’s circuit
applies to federal legal claims.41 The seminal case on this issue is In re
Korean Air Lines Disaster of September 1, 1983, which was decided in
the District of Columbia Circuit.42 In that case, the court addressed the
question of whether the law of the transferee or the transferor forum applied to the interpretation of the federal Warsaw Convention/Montreal
Agreement.43 The court refused to extend the rationale of Van Dusen v.
Barrack to federal law, holding instead that the law of the transferee forum governs the determination of federal claims.44 Accordingly, the
transferee court is under no obligation to defer to the interpretation of the
transferor circuit when dealing with federal law issues.45 In reaching the
conclusion that the transferee court’s law applied, then-Circuit Court
Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg cited the dual goals of uniformity in federal
law and judicial efficiency:
Application of Van Dusen in the matter before us, we emphasize,
would not produce uniformity. There would be one interpretation
of federal law for the cases initially filed in districts within the
Second Circuit, and an opposing interpretation for cases filed elsewhere. Applying divergent interpretations of the governing federal
law to plaintiffs, depending solely upon where they initially filed
suit, would surely reduce the efficiencies achievable through con41. This view has been embodied by the decisions of the District of Columbia, Second, Fourth,
Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits. Murphy v. FDIC, 208 F.3d 959, 966 (11th Cir.
2000); Bradley v. United States, 161 F.3d 777, 782 n.4 (4th Cir. 1998); In re Temporomandibular
Joint Implants Prods. Liab. Litig., 97 F.3d 1050, 1055 (8th Cir. 1996); Newton v. Thomason, 22 F.3d
1455, 1460 (9th Cir. 1994); Menowitz v. Brown, 991 F.2d 36, 40 (2d Cir. 1993); Eckstein v. Balcor
Film Investors, 8 F.3d 1121, 1126 (7th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1073 (1994); In re Korean
Air Lines Disaster of September 1, 1983, 829 F.2d 1171, 1174 (D.C. Cir. 1987), aff’d on other
grounds sub nom. Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd., 490 U.S. 122 (1989). It should be noted that
there is a circuit split on the issue of whether the transferor or transferee choice-of-law rules should
apply when a case has been transferred and Congress has expressed its intention that the federal rules
should not be interpreted in a geographically uniform fashion. Compare Menowitz, 991 F.2d at 40
(holding that Van Dusen and Ferens apply only in diversity cases), with Eckstein, 8 F.3d at 1127
(“[W]hen the law of the United States is geographically non-uniform, a transferee court should use
the rule of the transferor forum in order to implement the central conclusion of Van Dusen and Ferens: that a transfer under § 1404(a) accomplishes ‘but a change of courtrooms.’”).
42. In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of September 1, 1983, 829 F.2d 1171 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
43. Id. at 1172, 1174.
44. Id. at 1175–76.
45. Id. at 1172, 1174.

2010]

Comity Versus Unitary Law: A Clash of Principles

369

solidated preparatory proceedings. Indeed, because there is ultimately a single proper interpretation of federal law, the attempt to
ascertain and apply diverse circuit interpretations simultaneously is
inherently self-contradictory.46

In contrast to analyzing issues of state law, which is anticipated to
present and require the application of laws that may differ from state to
state, “the federal courts comprise a single system [in which each court
endeavors to apply] a single body of law.”47 Therefore, the Korean Air
Lines court reasoned, “it is logically inconsistent to require one judge to
apply simultaneously different and conflicting interpretations of what is
supposed to be a unitary federal law.”48
In sum, the Supreme Court has held that the choice-of-law rules of
the state in which the case was originally filed govern the choice-of-law
analysis for state law substantive law issues even if the case is transferred
to another district. This is because, for state law purposes, a transfer is
but a change of courtrooms that should not impact the substantive law at
issue.49 This reasoning reflects deference to legal pluralism in state law
issues and an acknowledgement that one party should not benefit over
another because of a change in venue to another district.50 In contrast,
courts that examine federal choice-of-law issues in the MDL context
have applied the law of the transferee circuit because federal law is supposed to be unitary and consistent, not pluralistic.51 The federal courts
that consider federal choice-of-law issues do not seem troubled by the
fact that application of the transferee courts’ precedent to a federal legal
issue may benefit one party over another simply because of a change in
venue.
IV. CHOICE-OF-LAW RULES FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION PROCEEDINGS
IN MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION
The choice-of-law issues discussed in Part III above divide neatly
along state and federal law lines, with the former requiring the state law
46. Id. at 1175 (interpreting Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964)). While the court
noted that the law of the transferor forum “merits close consideration,” it determined that the transferor forum’s law “does not have stare decisis effect in a transferee forum situated in another circuit.”
Id. at 1176.
47. Id. (quoting H.L. Green Co. v. MacMahon, 312 F.2d 650, 652 (2d Cir. 1962), cert denied,
372 U.S. 928 (1963)).
48. Id. at 1175–76.
49. Van Dusen, 376 U.S. at 639.
50. Id.
51. See discussion, supra note 41.
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of the transferor jurisdiction and the latter requiring the federal law of the
transferee jurisdiction. One might intuitively think that federal class action certification determinations would necessarily follow the transferee
jurisdiction’s law. After all, class certification is governed by Rule 23,52
which is a federal procedural law. The case law, however, is split on this
issue.
As described below in Part IV.A, one camp has applied the law of
the transferor courts. Courts falling into this camp reason that Korean
Air Lines and its progeny, which use the transferee court’s law for federal issues, do not apply to class certification because class certification is
an issue that impacts both pretrial and trial proceedings. Because the
52. FED. R. CIV. P. 23. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) and (b) provide:
(a) Prerequisites.
One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of
all members only if:
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable,
(2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class,
(3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims
or defenses of the class; and
(4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of
the class.
(b) Types of Class Actions.
A class action may be maintained if Rule 23(a) is satisfied and if:
(1) prosecuting separate actions by or against individual class members would
create a risk of:
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual class
members that would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the
party opposing the class; or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual class members that, as a
practical matter, would be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the individual adjudications or would substantially
impair or impede their ability to protect their interests;
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole; or
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to class members
predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a
class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy. The matters pertinent to these findings include:
(A) the class members’ interests in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions;
(B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already begun by or against class members;
(C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the
claims in the particular forum; and
(D) the likely difficulties in managing a class action.
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cases will be transferred to the transferor courts for trial as required by
Lexecon, courts that follow the principle of comity reason that the transferor courts’ precedent must apply to the class certification decision.
Another camp has applied the law of the transferee court, reasoning
that Korean Air Lines and its progeny do apply to class certification. As
described in Part IV.B below, these courts, influenced by the principle of
unitary law, reason that there is only one proper interpretation of federal
law, and therefore each district court must interpret Rule 23 consistent
with the precedent of its own circuit. These cases also stress that applying one circuit’s law to the class certification determination is efficient
because a district court need not use multiple circuits’ precedent in making class certification determinations.53 The discussion below describes
the division between these two competing camps and the clash of principles these cases reflect.
A. The Comity Approach
“Comity” is an informal practice where a court gives “mutual recognition” to another court’s judicial acts.54 Ulrich Huber, a Dutch jurist
from the 17th Century, is generally regarded as the father of the principle
of comity in the legal context.55 In his work, De Conflictu Legum, Huber
explained that “‘[c]omity calls on states to recognize and enforce rights
created by other states, provided that such recognition does not prejudice
the state or its subjects.”56
The U.S. legal system has embraced this principle and it can arise
in many contexts.57 For example, in the international law context, the

53. This does not mean, however, that the district court need only use one state’s substantive
law. An MDL action may involve numerous state law claims, each of which must be analyzed under
the choice-of-law rules of each state at issue. See Van Dusen, 376 U.S. at 639. The only efficiency
achieved with the unitary law approach is derived from using one circuit’s precedent on Rule 23.
54. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 285 (8th ed. 2004).
55. Ulrich Huber’s work De Conflictu Legum was a landmark in the development of choice-oflaw theory. GARY BORN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS:
COMMENTARY & MATERIALS 547 (3d ed. 1996); D.J. Llewelyn Davies, The Influence of Huber’s
Conflictu Legum on English Private International Law, 18 BRIT. Y. B. INT’L L. 49 (1937); Arthur
Nussbaum, Rise and Decline of the Law-of-Nations Doctrine in the Conflict of Laws, 42 COLUM. L.
REV. 189 (1942); Hessel R. Yntema, The Comity Doctrine, 65 MICH. L. REV. 9 (1966).
56. Ulrich Huber, De Conflictu Legum, Praelectiones Juris Romani et Hodierni (1689). For an
English translation, see Ernest G. Lorenzen, Huber’s De Conflictu Legum, in SELECTED ARTICLES
ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 136 (1947).
57. Justice Story has been credited as the most important factor in injecting Huber’s conception
of comity into United States jurisprudence. See BORN, supra note 55; Ernest G. Lorenzen, Story’s
Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws—One Hundred After, 48 HARV. L. REV. 15 (1934); Kurt H.
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United States may give legal effect to a foreign nation’s legal decision.58
Comity may also arise when federal courts abstain from deciding a state
legal issue that has not yet been addressed by a state court on the theory
that the states should have the ability to govern their affairs without unnecessary federal intrusion.59
Within the MDL context, comity arises in connection with choiceof-law analysis for class certification. The case that best embodies the
impact of this principle is In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether Products
Liability Litigation (“MTBE I”).60 In MTBE I, plaintiff residents and
property owners brought state law claims (e.g., nuisance, trespass, negligence, and strict liability) in state courts against oil and pipeline companies for damages arising from gasoline release.61 The cases were removed to federal district courts, and the Panel transferred the cases to the
Southern District of New York under the MDL procedure.62 In addressing class certification, the MTBE I court considered whether the law of
the transferor court (Seventh Circuit) or the law of its own circuit

Nadelmann, Joseph Story’s Contribution to American Conflicts Law: A Comment, 5 AM. J. LEGAL
HIST. 230 (1961).
58. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163 (1895) (laying the framework for comity considerations
in international law cases); see also Victrix S.S. Co., S.A. v. Salen Dry Cargo A.B., 825 F.2d 709,
713–16 (1987).
59. Brockett v. Spokane Arcade, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 508 (1985). The Supreme Court
has long recognized that concerns for comity and federalism may require federal courts to
abstain from deciding federal constitutional issues that are entwined with the interpretation of state law. . . . [W]here uncertain questions of state law must be resolved before a
federal constitutional question can be decided, federal courts should abstain [from reaching a decision on federal issues] until a state court has addressed the state questions.
Id. Similarly, based on the underlying principle of comity, the Supreme Court has generally refused
to allow federal courts to intervene in pending cases in state courts. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S.
37 (1971), noting that “comity” requires
[A] proper respect for state functions, a recognition of the fact that the entire country is
made up of a Union of separate state governments, and a continuance of the belief that
the National Government will fare best if the States and their institutions are left free to
perform their separate functions in their separate ways. This, perhaps, for lack of a better
and clearer way to describe it, is referred to by many as “Our Federalism,” and one familiar with the profound debates that ushered our Federal Constitution into existence is
bound to respect those who remain loyal to the ideals and dreams of “Our Federalism.”
Id. at 44.
60. See In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether Prods. Liab. Litig., 241 F.R.D. 435 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)
[hereinafter MTBE I].
61. Id. at 437–38.
62. 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1976).
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(Second Circuit) applied to the Rule 23 analysis.63 The court found that
the transferor court’s law applied.64
The MTBE I decision largely turned on the distinction between pretrial and trial proceedings, the nature of class certification, and the Supreme Court’s Lexecon65 decision, which, as discussed above, held that
the Panel is obligated to remand any transferred cases back to the transferor courts for trial. The court explained that class certification is not only
a pre-trial issue: class certification requirements are “inherently enmeshed” with trial considerations because the trial court will need to examine the facts and law raised by the class claims.66 Further, under Supreme Court precedent, “courts must determine whether Rule 23 is satisfied for purposes of trial before granting certification.”67 Given Lexecon’s holding that § 1407 requires cases to remand to the transferor
courts for trial, the transferee court’s authority ends once the pretrial proceedings are completed.68 Accordingly, the MTBE I court reasoned, “[i]t
would be neither just nor efficient to apply the law of this Circuit in considering class certification, and then force the transferor court to try a
class action that it might never have certified.”69 Thus, the court applied
the law of the transferor court in examining class certification.70
63. MTBE I, 241 F.R.D. at 439–41.
64. Id.
65. Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 28 (1998); see infra
Part I.B.
66. MTBE I, 241 F.R.D. 435, 440–41 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). The court, in holding that class certification was not only a pre-trial issue, stated that the requirements of class certification were “inherently enmeshed” with considerations of the trial in requiring analysis of “the factual and legal issues
comprising the plaintiff’s cause of action.” Id. (quoting Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S.
463, 469 (1978)). In a subsequent decision, the same court addressed this choice-of-law issue once
again and decided that the transferor court’s law applies to class certification in MDL actions. See
MTBE II, 241 F.R.D. 185, 191–93 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). Because this decision is consistent with
MTBE I and does not offer any additional material insights into the choice-of-law decision, this
Article focuses on the MTBE I decision.
67. MTBE I, 241 F.R.D. at 440 (citing Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 625–
28 (1997)).
68. Id. (citing Lexecon, 523 U.S. at 40).
69. Id.
70. The MTBE I decision noted that another reason to apply the transferor court’s law to the
class certification decision was that the plaintiffs had initially filed their state law tort claims in state
court and later had the claims removed to federal court. Id. at 440–41. The court reasoned that
“[n]either party should be prejudiced in preparing for trial because the case was removed and transferred to another district in a different circuit.” Id. at 441. The court’s focus on the fact that the
cases involved removed state law claims makes little sense. While it is true that the district court
may need to examine the elements of state substantive law in conducting its class certification analysis under Rule 23, it does not follow that the class certification analysis is an issue of state substantive law. The class certification determination under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 is a federal
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More recently, the District of Nevada also concluded that the law of
the transferor courts governs class certification in MDL proceedings.71
In re Wal-Mart Wage and Hour Employment Practices Litigation was an
MDL action involving approximately thirty-four wage-and-hour class
actions brought against Wal-Mart in federal courts throughout the United
States.72 The plaintiffs filed a motion to certify state-wide classes encompassing state law claims in four of the thirty-four cases involving
three different federal circuits (the Third, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits).73
In analyzing class certification, the Wal-Mart court acknowledged that
potential choice-of-law issues and conflicts existed.74 The court generally applied the transferee circuit’s law, noting that “the law relating to
class certification is fairly consistent within all three circuits.”75 “To the
extent the law[s] of the Third and Eighth Circuits diverge,” however, the
court stated that it would “consider [the divergence] to determine whether any difference in the law of the respective transferor circuits would
affect the outcome of the issue of class certification.”76 The court then
analyzed the divergent standards regarding whether injunctive relief predominates for Rule 23(b)(2) purposes, because “[t]his [was] one area
where the law of the Circuits at issue may diverge.”77 The court ultiprocedural issue. Under the Rules Enabling Act, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure may not
“abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (1990). If it were true that
a court must apply the transferor courts’ laws whenever it would need to examine state substantive
law as part of carrying out its analyses under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, then the court
would need to apply the transferor courts’ laws for any motion to dismiss under Rule 12 or summary
judgment under Rule 56 for state law claims. But such a result would not only be inconsistent with
the Korean Air Lines line of cases, supra Part III.B., but it would also be at odds with the MTBE
cases because the court had previously decided that it was bound by the law of the transferee court
in deciding a motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ state tort claims. In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether Prods.
Liab. Litig., No. 1:00-1898, MDL 1358 (SAS), M21-88, 2005 WL 106936, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 18,
2005). Moreover, this division of state-versus-federal claims would make little sense in a case that
raised both state and federal claims because the court would have to apply the transferor court’s Rule
23 precedent to some claims and the transferee court’s Rule 23 precedent to other claims, which
would be an absurd result. Thus, it is clear that the lynchpin of the MTBE I decision is not that state
law claims were at issue, but rather that § 1407(a), per Lexecon, requires the Panel to remand the
cases to the transferor courts for trial, and the fact that class certification is a pre-trial and a trial
issue. MTBE I, 241 F.R.D. at 440–41.
71. In re Wal-Mart Wage & Hour Employment Practices Litig., No. 2:06-CV-00225-PMPPAL, 2008 WL 3179315 (D. Nev. June 20, 2008).
72. Id.
73. Id. at *5.
74. Id.
75. Id. The court largely applied Ninth Circuit law, which was both the transferee circuit’s law
and one of the transferor circuit’s law.
76. Id.
77. See id. at *16.
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mately concluded that plaintiffs failed to meet their burden “[u]nder any
Circuit’s test.”78
In sum, the principle of comity influenced these courts to defer to
the laws of the transferor courts in examining class certification. MTBE
I, in particular, focused on the fact that the transferee court is merely
handling the cases for pretrial proceedings and the Panel will remand the
cases back to the transferor courts for trial. As explained below, this
comity approach has been criticized and rejected by other courts that
hold the principle of unitary law in higher esteem.
B. The Unitary Law Approach
The concept of unitary law in the federal law context is straightforward; the principle provides that there is only one body of federal law
and “there is ultimately a single proper interpretation of federal law.”79
Within the transfer context, the Korean Air Lines case best embodies the
principle of unitary law.80 Unlike the state law system, in which differences are accepted as an embodiment of our valuable federalism, inconsistent interpretations of federal law among the federal courts is cause for
concern81 and may lead the United States Supreme Court to grant certiorari to eliminate incongruity.82 At its core, the principle of unitary law
has considerations of consistency and efficiency in mind.83
The principle of unitary law has motivated some courts to apply the
law of the transferee court in class certification determinations in MDL
cases. Currently, the most important case on this topic is the Central
78. Id. The court did not explain why it needed to examine the precedent of the transferor
courts, though it presumably did so because it was persuaded by Wal-Mart’s class certification briefing, which, largely based on the MTBE I case, argued that the transferee court should defer to the
transferor courts’ laws for the class certification analysis.
79. In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of September 1, 1983, 829 F.2d 1171, 1175 (D.C. Cir.
1987).
80. Id. at 1174–76. See also discussion supra Part III.B.
81. Id. at 1175 (“Our system contemplates differences between different states’ laws; thus a
multidistrict judge asked to apply divergent state positions on a point of law would face a coherent,
if sometimes difficult, task. But it is logically inconsistent to require one judge to apply simultaneously different and conflicting interpretations of what is supposed to be a unitary federal law.”).
82. SUP. CT. R. 10 provides, in pertinent part:
Review on a writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of judicial discretion. A petition for a writ of certiorari will be granted only for compelling reasons. The following,
although neither controlling nor fully measuring the Court’s discretion, indicate the character of the reasons the Court considers: (a) a United States court of appeals has entered
a decision in conflict with the decision of another United States court of appeals on the
same important matter. . . .
83. Korean Air Lines, 829 F.2d at 1175.
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District of California’s decision in In re Live Concert Antitrust Litigation.84 The court in Live Concert held that the transferee court’s law applies to class certification determinations in the MDL context.85 The
Live Concert court noted that “circuit and district courts, including the
Ninth Circuit, have uniformly applied the law of the transferee circuit in
MDL proceedings involving federal law.”86 In particular, the court focused on the reasoning in Korean Air Lines, and decided that it would
give transferor circuit precedent “close consideration,”87 but was bound
to follow only the precedent of its own circuit and the Supreme Court.88
The court determined that there were many reasons to apply the law
of the transferee court, including the “reduction in efficiency of forcing a
court to apply divergent interpretations of governing federal law and the
logical inconsistency of requiring one judge to apply simultaneously different and conflicting interpretations of what is supposed to be a unitary
federal law.”89 The Live Concert court also found support for its decision in the law-of-the-case doctrine. Quoting Korean Air Lines, the Live
Concert court reasoned that its interpretation of federal law would have
binding force upon the cases’ return to the transferor courts, “for if it did
not, transfers under 28 U.S.C. § 1407 could be counterproductive, i.e.,
capable of generating rather than reducing the duplication and protraction Congress sought to check.”90 Thus, according to the Live Concert
court, the transferor courts would effectively be precluded from relitigating this issue upon remand by the law-of-the-case doctrine.91
Similarly, the District of New Jersey’s decision in In re Managerial, Professional & Technical Employees supports the conclusion that the
84. In re Live Concert Antitrust Litigation, 247 F.R.D. 98 (C.D. Cal. 2007).
85. Id. at 104–05.
86. The court cited to numerous cases addressing choice-of-law issues. Id. at 105 n.8.
87. Id. at 105. The Live Concert court’s statement that it would give “close consideration” to
the transferor court’s law is both significant and puzzling. It is significant because it is an express
acknowledgement of the desire for comity, otherwise there would be no reason to even consider
what a transferor jurisdiction might do when considering class certification. However, the statement
is also puzzling because it is not clear why the court would need to consider the transferor court’s
law if it will be trumped by the transferee court’s law in any event. The court’s statement is further
puzzling because it did not engage in any analysis of the transferor court’s law.
88. Id. at 104.
89. Id. (citing In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of September 1, 1983, 829 F.2d 1171, 1173–
1176 (D.C. Cir. 1987)). This reasoning is contrary to MTBE I. Live Concert explicitly rejected the
MTBE I court’s reasoning that “it would be neither just nor efficient to apply the law of this Circuit
in considering class certification, and then force the transferor court to try a class action that it might
never have certified.” Id. at 105 n.8 (quoting MTBE I, 241 F.R.D. at 193).
90. Id. at 105 n.8 (quoting Korean Air Lines, 829 F.2d at 1176).
91. Id.
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transferee court’s law governs Rule 23 determinations in MDL cases.92
In that MDL proceeding, employees of major U.S. oil companies alleged
that the companies violated the Sherman Act by exchanging detailed salary information which slowed the rate of salary increases.93 The lawsuits
were filed in federal courts in New York, Texas, and New Jersey and
were consolidated before the District of New Jersey under the MDL procedure. In analyzing class certification, the court noted that it “must first
determine whether to apply the law of the Third Circuit or, if different,
the law of the circuit from which each of the consolidated cases originated. Where the claim arises under federal law, as is the case here, the
appropriate course is to apply the law of the transferee court.”94 The
court noted that applying the transferor court’s law had some appeal because “the pretrial nature of multidistrict transfers suggests that the law
of the origin circuit should apply,” but ultimately relied on the principle
of unitary law espoused in Korean Air Lines and decided that “the transferee court [should] be free to decide a federal claim in the manner it
views as correct without deferring to the interpretation of the transferor
circuit.”95
In sum, there is a sharp division between the courts that apply the
transferor court’s law and the courts that apply the transferee court’s law
in class certification determinations in MDL actions. The former follows
92. In re Managerial, Professional & Technical Employees, No. 02-CV-2924 (GEB), 2006 WL
38937, at *1 (D.N.J. Jan. 5, 2006).
93. Id.
94. Id. at *2.
95. Id. (quoting Korean Air Lines, 829 F.2d 1171, 1174–76 and Richard L. Marcus, Conflict
Among Circuits and Transfers Within the Federal Judicial System, 93 YALE L.J. 677, 721 (1984)).
Other courts have supported the conclusion that class certification should be decided under the transferee court’s laws. The Western District of Oklahoma, in In re General Motors Corporation “Piston
Slap” Products Liability Litigation, addressed the application of transferee versus transferor circuit
law in determining the propriety of class certification under Rule 23. MDL No. 04-1600, 2006 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 26603, at *2 n.6 (W.D. Okla. Apr. 19, 2006). This case only briefly touched upon the
issue, but the court’s preference for the law of the transferee circuit was clear: “Although this proceeding involves multiple cases transferred to this Court under the MDL procedure, in analyzing
questions of federal law a transferee court applies the law of the circuit in which it is located.” Id.
Accordingly, the court applied the precedent of the circuit in which it was located in interpreting the
standard for class certification under Rule 23. See id. Similarly, in In re Farmers Insurance Exchange Claims Representatives’ Overtime Pay Litigation, 300 F. Supp. 2d 1020, 1031 at n.12 (D.
Or. 2003), the District of Oregon noted the preference for applying the law of the transferee circuit
in a federal MDL proceeding, relying upon its own Ninth Circuit precedent to interpret the scope of
the administrative exemption under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). Though the Court did not
explicitly address the application of transferor versus transferee circuit law in certifying the seven
state law classes under FLSA, it exclusively applied transferee Ninth Circuit precedent in interpreting and applying the standard for Rule 23 class certification. Id.
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the principle of comity and voluntarily defers to the transferor courts,
which is where the cases will be returned for trial. The latter follows the
principle of unitary law and takes encouragement from the fact that applying the law of one jurisdiction is efficient.
V. BOTH THE UNITARY LAW APPROACH AND THE COMITY APPROACH
HAVE MAJOR FLAWS
Both the comity and unitary law approaches to the class certification choice-of-law question suffer from intractable flaws. This Part discusses how neither of these approaches adequately address the choice-oflaw question for class certification in MDL proceedings.
A. The Unitary Law Approach’s Flaws
Transferee courts that interpret class certification under their own
circuits’ laws have justified doing so under the principle of unitary law
because it fosters consistency and efficiency. However, in some cases,
the unitary law approach may produce inefficient or arguably unfair results. Specifically, the unitary law approach has two major flaws: (1)
there are limits to the law-of-the-case doctrine that the unitary law approach relies on, especially when constitutional concerns arise, and those
limitations may lead transferor courts to reverse the transferee court’s
class certification decision upon remand; and (2) the change of forum
may have a significant impact on the parties’ rights and the outcome of
the litigation.
1. Limits of the Law-of-the-Case Doctrine
The unitary law approach’s primary failure is that it does not take
into account the limits of the law-of-the-case doctrine. Critical of the
unitary law approach, the MTBE I court noted that the transferor court
will regain control of the case at trial and it “would be neither just nor
efficient” to apply the law of the transferee circuit “in considering class
certification, and then force the transferor court to try a class action that
it might never have certified.”96 Following the principle of unitary law,
the Live Concert case attempted to counter this argument by pointing out
that the principle of the “law of the case” would cure that problem—for
example, it does not matter if the transferor court might not have certi-

96. MTBE I, 241 F.R.D. 435, 439 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
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fied the class because the transferor court is bound by the transferee
court’s decision when the cases are remanded for trial.97
This unitary law counter argument only goes so far, however. The
law-of-the-case doctrine—the doctrine limiting re-litigation of a decision
in the same case—is discretionary in nature.98 In other words, the lawof-the-case doctrine does not strictly limit a court’s power to revisit an
issue. Indeed,
[w]hen a court applies the law of the case doctrine to its own prior
decisions (or those of a coordinate or equal court), the traditional
formulations of the doctrine must be conceived as rules of thumb
and not as straightjackets on the informed discretion and sound
practical judgment of the judge.99

The law-of-the-case doctrine is also limited in that district courts
“owe obedience to the court of appeals in the circuit in which they sit. If
the law in the transferor circuit differs from that in the transferee circuit
where class certification was originally decided, the transferor court will
invite reversal by upholding the law of the case.”100 Importantly, the
law-of-the-case doctrine has no effect on the court of appeals, which can
review issues arising in the district court without any restrictions.101
Thus, a transferor district court to which a case is remanded for trial may
be loathe to abide by the law of the case for fear that it will waste its time

97. In re Live Concert Antitrust Litig., 247 F.R.D. 98, 105 n.8 (C.D. Cal. 2007).
98. See, e.g., Perillo v. Johnson, 205 F.3d 775, 780 (5th Cir. 2000); First Union Bank v. Pictet
Overseas Trust Corp., 477 F.3d 616, 620 (8th Cir. 2007).
99. 18 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE, ¶ 134.21[1] (3d ed. 1999)
(citing Prisco v. A & D Carting Corp., 168 F.3d 593, 607 (2d Cir. 1999)); United States v. Dunbar,
357 F.3d 582, 592–93 (6th Cir. 2004); Christianson v. Colt Industries Operating Corp, 486 U.S. 800,
817 (1998).
100. MOORE’S at ¶ 134.21[1].
101. Christianson, 486 U.S. at 816; McMasters v. United States, 260 F.3d 814, 818 (7th Cir.
2001). In McMasters, the Central District of California ruled that service of process on the United
States was effective even though no attempt had been made to serve the United States Attorney. The
case was then transferred to the Northern District of Illinois under a § 1404(a) transfer. The transferee court then dismissed the action for insufficient service of process. The Seventh Circuit held that
the law-of-the-case doctrine generally requires a court after transfer to refrain from reopening rulings
made before transfer, but allows reconsideration to correct clear error. On appeal, moreover, the
law-of-the-case constraints that apply between trial courts evaporate: the question for the appellate
court is to identify the correct rule of law. Even if the Ninth Circuit would hold the service effective,
the Seventh Circuit indicated that it must nonetheless apply its own view of the correct answer to a
question of federal law because the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are not intended to be geographically non-uniform. Id.
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with a trial only to have its circuit court reverse the class certification
decision.102
The unitary law approach, which relies on the law-of-the-case doctrine, is also ill-equipped to deal with constitutional law dilemmas that
may arise upon remand. Class certification issues are sometimes inextricably tied to fundamental principles of due process, the right to a trial
by a jury, and the Rules Enabling Act,103 which makes adherence to the
law of the case in the class action context more problematic than in some
other areas of the law that do not implicate such fundamental issues. For
example, there is currently a split in authority regarding whether the doctrine of fluid recovery may be applied to alleviate individualized questions of causation, injury-in-fact, and damages.104 Some circuits, including the Second Circuit, have flatly rejected the doctrine of fluid recovery
as a violation of due process and the Rules Enabling Act.105 Other
courts, such as the Seventh Circuit, have indicated that fluid recovery
might be appropriate when “the use of such a mechanism is consistent
with the policy or policies reflected by the statute violated.”106 This circuit split highlights a potential dilemma for a transferor court.
To bring this dilemma into perspective, consider a theoretical case
filed in the District of Vermont (in the Second Circuit) that is transferred
via the MDL procedure to the Southern District of Illinois (in the Seventh Circuit). If the transferee court applies the law of its own circuit, it
might certify a class action after determining that a fluid recovery would
be appropriate under the circumstances of the case. If the case is then
remanded back to the District of Vermont, that court will be faced with a
choice: follow the law of the case, which would render an unconstitutional result under Second Circuit law, or follow its own circuit’s law

102. See, e.g., In re Baseball Bat Antitrust Litig., 112 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1177 (J.P.M.L. 2000)
(the circuit court with jurisdiction over the district court of origin has the “power and authority to
review any and all rulings made in the case, without regard to whether those rulings were made by
the transferee court or the transferor court”); In re Briscoe, 448 F.3d 201, 213–14 (3d Cir. 2006) (A
transferee court’s “previously unreviewed rulings are properly raised in the court of appeals for the
transferor district should the case reach a final judgment there.”).
103. The Rules Enabling Act provides that federal rules of procedure, such as Rule 23, cannot
be used to “abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2008).
104. Under the doctrine of fluid recovery, “the jury determines the aggregate damage to the
class without deciding how much each individual class member is to receive. Allocation of the
award is made later, administratively, upon the submission of claims, and often according to formula.” In re Neurontin Mktg. & Sale Practices Litig., 244 F.R.D. 89, 112 (D. Mass. 2007) (quoting In
re New Motor Vehicles Canadian Exp. Antitrust Litig., 235 F.R.D. 127, 143 (D. Me. 2006)).
105. McLaughlin v. American Tobacco Co., 522 F.3d 215, 231–32 (2d Cir. 2008).
106. Simer v. Rios, 661 F.2d 655, 676 (7th Cir. 1981).
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and decertify the class. Presumably, the transferor court would opt for
the latter approach and uphold its oath to “support and defend the Constitution of the United States.”107 Thus, the unitary law approach is flawed
because it relies on the potentially incorrect assumption that the transferor court will abide by the transferee court’s class certification decision
under the law-of-the-case doctrine. To the extent that the transferor court
does not abide by the transferee court’s previous decision and instead
applies its own law to decertify the class, then the unitary law approach
would, in that circumstance, work less efficiently than the comity approach.
Within the class certification context, Rule 23’s text appears to invite a court to revisit class certification decisions and thus further weakens the law-of-the-case doctrine. Specifically, Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23(c)(1)(C) provides that “[a]n order that grants or denies
class certification may be altered or amended before final judgment.” In
other words, the rule itself provides the trial court flexibility to change its
mind or alter its certification order at any time prior to judgment. Therefore, after a court remands a case for trial, it is inconsistent with Rule
23(c)(1)(C) to require the transferor court to blindly abide by the class
certification ruling of the transferee court under the law-of-the-case doctrine, particularly when the transferee court could have freely altered the
order at any time if the case had not been transferred.108
2. A Venue Change May Impact the Litigation’s Outcome
At least with respect to issues of state law, it is well established that
when a case transfers from one district court to another, the transfer is
but a change of forum and should not impact the rights of the parties.109
However, when the law of the transferee court governs the class certification decision, a court operating under the unitary law approach will
107. 5 U.S.C. § 3331 (2009).
108. In In re Exterior Siding & Aluminum Coil Antitrust Litig., 696 F.2d 613, 616–18 (8th Cir.
1982), after a district judge in the District of Minnesota three times denied a motion to certify an
antitrust plaintiff class, courts transferred two other actions filed in other districts to the District of
Minnesota under the MDL procedure for consolidated pretrial proceedings. A district judge from
Pennsylvania was designated to conduct the proceedings, and granted certification of the class. The
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals initially issued mandamus to set aside the class certification. It
noted that a judge ordinarily should not set aside prior rulings by another judge in the same case
without good cause and concluded that class certification should require some showing of changed
law or facts. Id. Thereafter, however, the court of appeals voted en banc to deny the petition for
mandamus, without opinion. In re Exterior Siding & Aluminum Coil Antitrust Litig., 705 F.2d 980
(8th Cir. 1983).
109. Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 632 (1964). See also supra Part III.A.
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apply its own circuit’s class certification law. Thus, the transfer from
one district court to another may significantly impact whether the court
certifies a class.
Thus far, the Panel has not addressed this important topic. In a similar context, however, the Panel expressly refused to address the choiceof-law issue. In In re General Motors Class E Stock Buyout Securities
Litigation, a plaintiff had been conditionally transferred to another district for multidistrict proceedings. The plaintiff argued unsuccessfully to
the Panel that a transfer could expose its case to dismissal because the
transferee court would apply the statute of limitations law of the transferee circuit rather than the transferor circuit.110 Rejecting the argument,
the Panel stated, “[W]hen determining whether to transfer an action under Section 1407 . . . it is not the business of the Panel to consider what
law the transferee court might apply.”111 The fact remains, however, that
transferring a case to a district that intends to apply its own circuit’s law
to the Rule 23 inquiry can dramatically affect the outcome of the case
depending on how “plaintiff friendly” the circuit is on class certification
issues.112
B. The Comity Approach’s Flaws
Although there are significant flaws associated with applying the
unitary law approach, the comity approach, which applies the laws of the
transferor circuit or circuits, suffers from major problems as well. The
chief problems with the comity approach are that it requires district
courts to shun their own circuit’s precedent, invites potentially inconsistent decisions within the same case, and leads to inefficiency.
1. Rejecting Controlling Precedent
One of the comity approach’s biggest problems is that it offends the
fundamental premise that a court should not make a decision that it believes is wrong. It is one thing for a district court to abide by controlling
precedent with which it disagrees under the doctrine of stare decisis, because that principle serves as an invaluable stabilizing feature of our
judicial system. However, it is wholly different for a district court to
shun the law of its own circuit in deference to a circuit court to which it
110. In re General Motors Class E Stock Buyout Sec. Litig., 696 F. Supp. 1546, 1547 (J.P.M.L.
1988).
111. Id.
112. The discussion above provides a ready example with respect to the circuit split on the
doctrine of fluid recovery. See supra Part V.A.1.
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owes no obedience. Ultimately, as aptly stated by the court in Korean
Air Lines, it would be “inherently self-contradictory” and “logically inconsistent to require one judge to apply simultaneously different and
conflicting interpretations of what is supposed to be a unitary federal
law.”113
In the same vein, there are significant limitations to a transferee
court’s deference to the transferor courts, many of which mirror the limitations of the law-of-the-case doctrine described above. For example,
what if a transferee court determines that the transferor court’s circuit
would apply a construction of Rule 23 deemed unconstitutional under its
own circuit’s law? Should the transferee court nevertheless apply that
unconstitutional law because it believes the transferor court will do so
upon remand? A district court should not play accomplice to a constitutional violation. A court faced with such a dilemma should apply its own
law and uphold the constitution as interpreted by its circuit.114 Efficiency
must yield to constitutional concerns.
2. An Invitation to Inconsistent Decisions
Another significant flaw of the comity approach is that it invites inconsistent rulings in the same case. If the transferee court must apply
different circuits’ precedent to the Rule 23 decision, inconsistent rulings
may result. The Wal-Mart case described above provides a helpful example.115 In that case, the district court, following the comity approach,
noted that there is a circuit split regarding which test to apply to determine the appropriateness of a Rule 23(b)(2) class.116 The Wal-Mart court
ultimately concluded that under the specific facts at issue, a Rule
23(b)(2) class would not be appropriate under any circuit’s test.117 If the
facts had been different, however, the court may have decided that it
needed to certify a Rule 23(b)(2) class in some of the cases, but not others, simply because it was using inconsistent tests under different circuits’ precedent. As noted in Korean Air Lines, this conflicting result
113. In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of September 1, 1983, 829 F.2d 1171, 1175–76 (D.C. Cir.
1987).
114. See discussion of MTBE I, supra note 60, and accompanying text. The court in MTBE I
did not have occasion to address whether deference to the transferor courts has limitations, but presumably the transferee district court would have misgivings about playing accomplice to a constitutional violation.
115. In re Wal-Mart Wage & Hour Employment Practices Litig., No. 2:06-CV-00225-PMPPAL, 2008 WL 3179315, at *1 (D. Nev. June 20, 2008). See discussion supra Part IV.A.
116. Id.
117. Id. at *16.
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would be “logically inconsistent.”118 It would also be “difficult to explain the rationality of such divergences to the lay persons served by the
federal judicial system.”119
3. The Comity Approach’s Inefficiency
The final problem with applying the transferor court’s law is a practical one: it reduces the efficiency of the MDL process. A transferee
court already faces extreme difficulty applying the substantive laws of all
of the underlying states in a multi-state MDL proceeding. If the court
must also apply varying interpretations of Rule 23 based on the original
location of the cases, the class certification process could bog down tremendously. Not uncommonly, the transferee district court would have to
consider the laws of half a dozen or more circuits because MDL proceedings often include cases pending across the United States. The MDL
procedure’s goals of increasing efficiency and eliminating confusion120
might be significantly impaired if the district court must navigate through
a maze of potentially conflicting class certification rules. Requiring a
transferee court to apply the laws of all the transferor circuits also increases the likelihood that the transferee court might improperly interpret
the law, both because the transferee court has less familiarity with other
circuits’ laws and because there are simply too many cases and wrinkles
in the law between circuits for the district court to capture every nuance.
The judiciary’s desire for efficiency, perhaps more than any other
factor, will motivate many district courts to find a justification for applying one circuit’s law, and preferably its own. As one commentator put it:
The transfer provisions would, however, be impaired substantially
by insisting upon adherence to transferor interpretation. Transferee
judges would be burdened with the difficult task of divining the attitude of the transferor circuit; such adherence would present new
problems in distinguishing between “substantive” matters, which
are governed by transferor interpretation, and “procedural” matters,
which are not; and consolidated treatment of transferred cases
would become more difficult or perhaps impossible. In this day of
escalating caseloads it is foolish to weaken the transfer devices,
which attempt to utilize the unified federal judicial system to relieve
118. Korean Air Lines, 829 F.2d at 1175–76.
119. Id. at 1176 n.8.
120. The MDL transfer rules are designed to eliminate “delay, confusion, conflict, inordinate
expense and inefficiency” during the pretrial period. In re Plumbing Fixture Cases, 298 F. Supp.
484, 495 (J.P.M.L. 1968) (discussing legislative history of statute).
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part of the burden on the courts. The courts should therefore recognize that the transferee court must be free to decide a federal claim
in the manner it views as correct without deferring to the interpretation of the transferor circuit.121

In summary, the current MDL remand procedure leads to two highly flawed approaches to the choice-of-law issue. Neither the comity approach nor the unitary law approach supplies an adequate answer to the
choice-of-law question: either the transferee district court abides by its
own circuit’s law and runs the risk that the transferor district court or
circuit will overturn the decision, or it makes a determination that may be
incorrect under its own circuit’s precedent to avoid a problem upon remand.
VI. A THIRD OPTION: CONGRESSIONAL ACTION
So which path is best? The above analysis of these two flawed approaches ultimately shows that neither presents a viable solution. A third
option, however, offers a solution to nearly all of the shortcomings presented by the comity and unitary law approaches: Congress should simply enact legislation that allows transferee courts under the MDL process
to keep the transferred cases for trial. Indeed, as described below, both
the House of Representatives and the Senate repeatedly examined the
problems of Lexecon and its remand obligation, but ultimately failed to
pass the necessary legislation. This Part describes a solution to remedy
the choice-of-law dilemma for class certification in MDL cases and the
necessary congressional action.
A. The Solution
The best available option to solve nearly all of the problems associated with the comity and unitary law approaches is to eliminate the remand requirement mandated by § 1407. If the transferee court can keep
the cases for trial, then the law-of-the-case problems described above
disappear because the transferor courts will not regain control of the cases, and therefore will not need to examine the class certification decisions. Nor will the transferee court need to worry that a transferor court
may later reverse the class certification decision because the transferor
court will never have occasion to consider the appropriateness of the certification decision.

121. Marcus, supra note 95, at 721.
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Allowing the transferee court to keep the cases for trial would also
increase efficiency. Prior to Lexecon, transferee courts would routinely
transfer the cases to themselves for trial purposes.122 This procedure allowed the transferee courts to efficiently handle not only pre-trial proceedings, but also trials of multiple cases presenting similar issues. As
the Manual for Complex Litigation explains, self-transfer to the transferee court has several efficiencies:
(1) during the often protracted time of the section 1407 assignment,
the transferee judge gains a solid understanding of the case, and it
makes sense for trial to be conducted by the judge with the greatest
understanding of the litigation; (2) the transferee judge may already
be trying the constituent centralized action(s), and there may be efficiencies in adjudicating related actions or portions thereof in one
trial; and (3) the transferee judge, if empowered to try the centralized actions, may have a greater ability to facilitate a global settlement.123

One can add to this list the efficiency gained by allowing the transferee
court to apply a single circuit’s law in deciding class certification.
Eliminating § 1407’s remand requirement would also ensure consistent results within the same MDL action. As described above, a transferee court that applies the comity approach may need to consider conflicting Rule 23 precedent of multiple circuit courts, which may cause it
to grant class certification to some of the cases, but not others. This
would produce a counterproductive result given that the MDL procedure
is designed to eliminate conflict, not facilitate it.124 If, however, the
transferee court keeps the cases for trial, the transferee court can safely
apply its own circuit’s law and achieve a consistent decision on class
certification.
One potential drawback under the current system remains uncured
by eliminating the remand procedure: a transfer from one jurisdiction to
another may alter the outcome of the litigation. A transfer from one district court to another with controlling case law that is more beneficial to
one party creates the possibility that the transfer may be case determinative. Of course, as described in Part III.B., that issue already exists in
MDL cases in connection with pretrial proceedings, such as motions to
dismiss and summary judgment, because the transferee courts apply their
122. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 20.132 (2009).
123. Id.
124. Plumbing Fixture Cases, 298 F. Supp. at 491–92 (explaining that elimination of conflict is
one of the main goals of the MDL procedure).
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own circuits’ law. Indeed, even the MTBE I court, which championed
the comity approach described above, applied the law of the transferee
court in examining a motion to dismiss.125 Thus, the current system already tolerates the reality that transfer under the MDL procedure may
cause a change in applicable federal precedent that may impact the result
of the litigation.
Further, the principle that the plaintiff should be able to choose its
forum only goes so far in federal court. Even under the current MDL
procedure, a transferor court can transfer a case to the transferee court for
all purposes under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).126 Moreover, as noted by the
Korean Air Lines court, “[t]he point has been cogently made that venue
provisions are designed with geographical convenience in mind, and not
to ‘guarantee that the plaintiff will be able to select the law that will govern the case.’”127 The Korean Air Lines court added that
[t]he federal courts comprise a single system [in which each tribunal
endeavors to apply] a single body of law; there is no compelling
reason to allow plaintiff to capture the most favorable interpretation
of that law simply and solely by virtue of his or her right to choose
the place to open the fray.128

As long as the Panel does not consider choice-of-law issues in deciding where to transfer cases, it is difficult to maintain that the Panel
favors either party through the MDL process. Indeed, the plaintiff may
even benefit by the MDL transfer if the transferee court uses its own circuit’s law in making the class certification decision. The transferee circuit’s law may be more “plaintiff friendly” than the transferor circuit’s
law. In fact, the plaintiff may have preferred to file the complaint in the
transferee court in the first instance if he had not been precluded from
doing so by venue considerations. Thus, although a real concern exists
that the MDL transfer may impact the outcome of the litigation, it is an

125. MTBE I, 241 F.R.D. 435, 441 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
126. LeMaster v. Purdue Pharma Co., No. Civ.A. 04-147-DLB, 2004 WL 1398213, at *1 (E.D.
Ky. June 18, 2004) (citing In re Oxycontin Antitrust Litig., 314 F. Supp. 2d 1388 (J.P.M.L 2004)).
Similarly, cases may be removed from state court to federal court even though the plaintiff may
prefer to remain in state court, which will have a significant impact on the procedural rules to be
applied in the case to the extent the state rules differ from the federal rules. 28 U.S.C. § 1441
(2008).
127. In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of September 1, 1983, 829 F.2d 1171, 1175 (D.C. Cir.
1987) (quoting Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 257 n.24 (1981)).
128. Id. (quoting H.L. Green Co. v. MacMahon, 312 F.2d 650, 652 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied,
372 U.S. 928 (1963)).
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acceptable cost because the Panel can remain impartial on this issue,129
and the risk is fairly evenly distributed to both sides in the lawsuit.
B. Congressional Action
As the Supreme Court recognized in Lexecon, “the proper venue for
resolving [the MDL remand procedure] remains the floor of Congress.”130 Shortly after the Court issued the Lexecon decision, the Judicial Conference of the United States requested that Congress eliminate
§ 1407’s remand requirement to allow the transferee courts to selftransfer cases.131 United States District Court Judge John F. Nangle,
former Chairman of the Panel, testified before the House Subcommittee
on Courts and Intellectual Property Committee on the Judiciary and
called the MDL remand requirement “a cumbersome, repetitive, costly,
potentially inconsistent, time consuming, inefficient and wasteful utilization of judicial and litigants’ resources.”132 Similarly, United States District Judge William T. Hodges, another former Chairman of the Panel,
told the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee that eliminating § 1407’s remand
requirement is imperative to facilitate settlements, reduce waste of judicial resources, and reduce the uncertainties, delay, and expense that parties may experience due to unnecessary duplication of litigation or inconsistent results in different jurisdictions.133
Both Houses of Congress considered eliminating Lexecon’s remand
requirement. Senator Orrin Hatch (R-Utah), for example, suggested that
eliminating § 1407’s remand requirement would “provide the MDL Panel with the most efficient option for resolving complex issues, the best
means to encourage universal settlements, and the most consistent approach for rendering decisions.”134 The House135 and the Senate136 pro129. In re General Motors Class E Stock Buyout Sec. Litig., 696 F. Supp. 1546, 1547 (J.P.M.L.
1988) (noting that the Panel will not consider choice-of-law issues in determining to which district to
transfer cases).
130. Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 40 (1998).
131. Marcia Coyle, Bill to Fix ‘Lexecon’ Sought in Congress, Issue is Handling of Multidistrict
Cases, NAT’L L.J., Jul. 10, 2006, at 1, 18.
132. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1999: Hearing on H.R. 1752 Before the Subcomm. on
Courts and Intellectual Property, 108th Cong. 56 (1999) (statement of Judge John F. Nangle,
Chairman, Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation); Multidistrict, Multiparty, Multiforum Jurisdiction Act of 1999: Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 56 (1999) (statement of Judge
John F. Nangle, Chairman, Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation).
133. Coyle, supra note 131, at 18.
134. 152 CONG. REC. S8272–73 (daily ed. July 26, 2006).
135. The Judicial Reform Act of 1998, H.R. 1252, 105th Cong. (1998), was passed in the
House and would have eliminated the § 1407 remand requirement, but it died in the Senate Judiciary
Committee. See H.R. 1252, 105th Cong. (1998), in 144 CONG. REC. S3585 (daily ed. Apr. 24,
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posed legislation multiple times that would amend § 1407 to allow transferee courts to retain the cases for trial. Ultimately, however, the legislation repeatedly languished in committees and died.137 On the available
record, it is difficult to know whether the legislation failed because Congress lacks interest in this issue or if lobbying efforts successfully
thwarted the legislation’s enactment. The sheer number of times proposed legislation has been introduced on this issue makes the former explanation unlikely. The record, however, does not reflect lobbying, and
we are left to speculate why Congress cannot synchronize its efforts to
enact the necessary legislation. Until it does, courts will be required to
weigh the principles of comity and unitary law in their choice-of-law
analysis for class certification decisions in MDL cases, and the result of
that weighing process will produce flawed results.
VII. CONCLUSION
The current MDL remand procedure creates a choice-of-law battle
for class certification that pits the principle of comity against the principle of unitary federal law. Because these are principles central to the
United States’ judicial system, it comes as no surprise that courts have
struggled with and disagreed on which principle prevails when the two
conflict. But this philosophical battle is a needless war that can be easily
ended by changing the MDL rules to allow the transferee court to retain
the transferred cases for trial. The courts, however, cannot spontaneously decide to implement a change; instead, Congress needs to act to eliminate the MDL remand procedure. Until Congress changes the law,
courts examining choice-of-law for class certification in MDL cases will

1998). In 1999, the House and the Senate passed the Multidistrict, Multiparty, Multiforum Trial
Jurisdiction Act of 1999, H.R. 2112, 106th Cong. (1999), but it died in conference committee. In the
107th Congress, the House passed H.R. 860, but the bill again languished in the Senate Judiciary
Committee until Congress adjourned. See also H.R. 860, 107th Cong, (2001), in 147 CONG. REC.
H1377 (daily ed. Mar. 14, 2001); Multidistrict Litigation Restoration Act of 2003, H.R. 1768, 108th
Cong. (2004) (described in 151 CONG. REC. H2121 (daily ed. Apr. 19, 2005) as passing in the House
by a roll call vote of 418–0, but later dying in the Senate Judiciary Committee); Multidistrict Litigation Restoration Act of 2005, H.R. 1038, 109th Cong. (2005) (passing in the House and dying in the
Senate Judiciary Committee at the adjournment of Congress at the end of the session).
136. The Senate has been less active than the House in trying to devise a Lexecon “fix,” but in
2006, Senator Hatch introduced the Multidistrict Litigation Restoration Act of 2006, which would
have eliminated § 1407’s remand requirement. Multidistrict Litigation Restoration Act of 2005, S.
3734, 109th Cong. (2006) (stating that the latest major action occurred on July 26, 2006, where it
was read twice and referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee). Ultimately, the legislation died in
the Senate Judiciary Committee.
137. See supra notes 135 and 136.
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find themselves in a difficult position with no satisfactory approach in
sight.

